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11 Introduction
In the context of a standard equilibrium matching framework (e.g. Pissarides [2000],
Mortensen and Pissarides [1994], Cole and Rogerson [1999]), this paper shows how
a duration dependent unemployment insurance (UI) system stabilises unemployment
levels over the business cycle. It establishes that re-entitlement eﬀects induced by
a ﬁnite duration UI program generate intertemporal tranfers from ﬁr m st h a th i r ei n
future booms to ﬁrms that hire in current recessions. These transfers imply a net
hiring subsidy in recessions which stabilises unemployment levels over the cycle.
Figure 1 provides some corroborative evidence of this eﬀect. It describes average
completed spells of unemployment in Britain and the USA for 1986-2001. The UI
scheme in the U.S. is typically described as a 6 month scheme. The UI scheme in the
U.K. instead pays beneﬁts for one year but, in addition, there is a relatively generous
social security scheme which pays beneﬁts indeﬁnitely once a worker’s UI payments
have expired [see Layard et al (1991)]. Figure 1 demonstrates that the average spell
of unemployment in the U.S. exhibits a lower mean and lower variance over the cycle
than in the U.K.. This fact is partly explained by the use of temporary layoﬀsi nt h e
U.S. But we show that as average unemployment spells increase, re-entitlement eﬀects
imply a direct hiring subsidy in a U.S. recession, while the U.K. system generates no
such stabilising eﬀect. The results are also consistent with Nickell [1997] who argues
that it is the diﬀerence in the duration of beneﬁts which mainly accounts for observed
international diﬀerences in the incidence of long-term unemployment.
The transfer mechanism works in a way analogous to Acemoglu [1997] and Ace-
moglu and Pischke [1999]. Those papers argue that with job destruction shocks, a
current worker/ﬁrm pair underinvests in general human capital. Their central insight
is that should the worker be laid oﬀ in the future, ex-post wage bargaining implies
the worker’s next, as yet unknown, employer will extract part of those investment
rents. As that employer is not identiﬁed at the time when the training takes place,
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Figure 1: Average duration of unemployment, US and UK
3labour market, a UI system generates the opposite transfer eﬀect. Should the worker
be laid oﬀ in the future, then being entitled to receive UI payments increases the
worker’s reservation wage when next unemployed, and the worker extracts greater
rents from his/her next future employer.
Recent ﬁndings in the on-the-job search literature provide a useful perspective
for our results (e.g. Stevens (2003)). With job turnover, regardless of whether it is
through a quit or layoﬀ, a current worker/ﬁrm pair would like to extract surplus from
the worker’s next future employer. To illustrate the issue, consider Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002a,2002b) who assume that when an employed worker receives an
outside oﬀer through on-the-job search, the two ﬁr m st h e nB e r t r a n dc o m p e t ef o rt h e
worker’s services. With identical ﬁr m s ,t h ew a g ei sb i du pt om a r g i n a lp r o d u c ta n d
so, if the worker quits, the outside ﬁrm makes no surplus by hiring the worker. This
‘mechanism’ is jointly eﬃc i e n tf o rt h eo r i g i n a lﬁrm/worker pair as it extracts full
rents from the worker’s next employer (should the worker quit). In contrast Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), Stevens (2003), Burdett and Coles (2003) assume ﬁrms do
not respond to outside oﬀers. If the outside ﬁrm hires the worker at a wage below
marginal product, the original worker/ﬁrm pair fail to extract full rents from that
employer and so some surplus is lost.
S ow h a tw o u l db ea ne ﬃcient separation contract in a Pissarides-type matching
environment with job destruction shocks? With identical ﬁrms and full information,
the optimal separation contract pays the worker marginal product while unemployed,
and nothing once the worker is re-employed; i.e., it is a private UI contract. This
contract is jointly eﬃcient as it raises the worker’s reservation wage (while unem-
ployed) to marginal product and so, even with ex-post wage bargaining, the worker’s
next employer cannot extract surplus rents - it hires the worker with wage equal to
marginal product. Clearly this contract also corrects the market failure identiﬁed in
Acemoglu [1997] and Acemoglu and Pischke [1999]. Presumably such contracts do
not exist as ﬁrms do not observe when ex-employees ﬁnd new work. One interpreta-
4tion of a government sponsored UI program, however, is that it acts as a third party
enforcement agency.
A simple numerical example illustrates the underlying mechanism and the poten-
tial magnitude of these transfers. Suppose as in the U.S. that the UI program stops
payments after 26 weeks of unemployment. Further suppose the business cycle is
simply a two state phenomenon - the economy is either in recession with an average
duration of unemployment equal to 18 weeks, or in a boom with an average duration
of unemployment of 8 weeks. At ﬁrst sight it seems trivially obvious that a ﬁnite
duration UI scheme will dampen employment variations over the cycle - recessions
imply lower reservation wages as more unemployed workers have expired UI beneﬁts.
Our argument is stronger - re-entitlement eﬀects generate an intertemporal transfer
between ﬁrms that hire in current recessions and ﬁrms that hire in future booms.
Those transfers are most easily understood by assuming ﬁrms have all the bargaining
power and so pay unemployed workers their reservation wage. If new entrants into
the labor market are not entitled to UI (only previously employed workers receive UI
compensation while unemployed) an immediate implication is that entrant workers
obtain no surplus from employment. Although the UI scheme may distort an entrant
worker’s reservation wage in the future, and so aﬀects the surplus obtained by a ﬁrm
which employs that worker in the future, that distortion is merely a transfer to the
current hiring ﬁrm which extracts those expected rents through a lower wage. In this
way a UI scheme with re-entitlement eﬀects generates a transfer of rents from future
to current hiring ﬁrms.
The numerical values above imply that in the recession, with average unemploy-
ment spell of 18 weeks, the mean remaining UI entitlement of a currently unemployed
worker is 12 weeks more UI.1 As the option of receiving those UI payments raises the
value of remaining unemployed, the reservation wage reﬂects the appropriately an-
nuitised value of those remaining payments. Most importantly, however, the wage
1This is computed using
R ∞
0 αwe−αws max[26 − s,0]ds with αw =1 /18.
5also reﬂects that the worker becomes re-entitled to full UI coverage. As has already
been established, this re-entitlement eﬀect means the worker can extract greater rents
from a future employer in the event of a job destruction shock.
In contrast in the boom, with average unemployment spell of 8 weeks, the mean
remaining entitlement of an unemployed worker is around 18 weeks more UI. This
raises the worker’s reservation wage and the hiring ﬁrm has to compensate the worker
for those foregone payments. But who enjoys those rents? As the worker has no
bargaining power (by assumption) those rents were fully extracted by the worker’s
previous employer who paid a lower wage to capture the expected value of these
re-entitlement rents. In this numerical example, therefore, the re-entitlement eﬀect
implies an average transfer of 18-12 = 6 weeks UI from ﬁr m st h a th i r ei nb o o m st o
ﬁrms that hire in recessions. Being a pure hiring subsidy in recessions, it is directly
employment stabilising over the recession. Furthermore, this hiring subsidy is not
insubstantial.
Of course the above is a stylised numerical example. The paper formally es-
tablishes the existence of this transfer eﬀect using a standard equilibrium matching
framework, where ﬁrms are subject to idiosynchratic job destruction shocks, and the
aggregate rate of job destruction evolves stochastically over time.2 Simulations estab-
lish that a reduction in the duration of UI, tied to a compensating increase in the level
of beneﬁts so that the budget balancing tax rate is held constant, implies a reduction
both in the average level of unemployment and in the variance of unemployment over
the cycle.
There are several related papers on duration dependent UI systems but, apart
from Millard and Mortensen (1997), all assume steady state. The optimal UI litera-
ture does not consider equilibrium - taking matching rates and wages as given, that
literature designs UI programs which insure employed workers against idiosynchratic
2Recent work by Shimer [2003] asserts that the labor market data for the US are inconsistent
with business cycles caused by changes in the job destruction rate. However, the eﬀects we discuss
here will be present whenever the expected duration of unemployment is higher in recessions.
6layoﬀ risk [e.g. Shavell and Weiss [1979], Hopenhayn and Nicolini [1997], Werning
(2002)]. The optimal job search literature instead asks how a duration dependent UI
program aﬀects reservation wages (e.g. Mortensen [1977], van den Berg [1990] but
also see Albrecht and Vroman [2001]). Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), Davidson
and Woodbury (1997), Millard and Mortensen (1997) consider how a duration de-
pendent UI system aﬀects unemployment in an equilibrium matching environment.
Those papers simplify by assuming wages are determined by Nash bargaining where
the worker’s threatpoint is the value of being unemployed while fully entitled to UI
payments. This assumes that ﬁrms cannot extract any rents due to re-entitlement
eﬀe c t sa n ds or u l e so u tt h ei n t e r t e m p o r a ll i n k a g e si d e n t i ﬁed here.
2T h e M o d e l .
Time is continuous and has an inﬁnite horizon. There is a continuum of identical
workers with mass normalized to one, and all workers are inﬁnitely lived. Each
worker may be in one of two states, employed or unemployed, where Ut denotes the
measure of workers unemployed at time t. There is also a continuum of vacancies
with measure Vt which will be determined endogenously via a standard free entry
condition.
There are matching frictions where a matching function Mt = M(Ut,V t) describes
the contact rate between the unemployed job seekers and the ﬁrms holding vacancies.
M is strictly increasing in both arguments, continuous, concave and homogenous of
degree 1 with M(0,V)=M(U,0) = 0 and MV(U,0) = ∞ for U>0.θ t = Vt/Ut
denotes labor market tightness at time t.F o rdt arbitrarily small, the probability an









and m is a strictly increasing, concave function of θ with m(0) = 0,m 0(0) = ∞.
7Similarly, the probability a vacancy is contacted by a searching worker over time














For simplicity, all are risk neutral and have the same discount rate r. If a worker is
employed at wage w, and employment is taxed at rate τ by the government, then the
employee receives utility wdtper instant dt, the ﬁrm obtains net proﬁt( p−w−τ)dt
and τd tis tax revenue collected per employed worker. Note, all ﬁrms are equally
productive and p does not vary over time. There is no on-the-job search - a worker
must quit before searching for alternative employment.
There are idiosynchratic job destruction shocks, where each job is destroyed ac-
cording to an independent Poisson process with parameter λt > 0, where λt describes
the aggregate rate of job destruction at time t. λt evolves according to an N-state
Markov process: λt can take one of N values λ





i,λ t switches state according to a Poisson process with parameter γ>0,
whereupon the new realised job destruction state is λ
j with probability πj. Assume
that when a job is destroyed, the worker is laid oﬀ and becomes unemployed.
The unemployment insurance system (UI) is described by a beneﬁtf u n c t i o nb(.),
where b(s)dt describes the beneﬁt paid over instant dt to a worker who has unem-
ployment duration s, and an employment tax τ.Note, the beneﬁtp r o ﬁle b(.) and tax
rate τ do not vary over the cycle. More generally, these policy parameters could vary
with time and be conditioned on the state of the economy. Assuming the scheme is
ﬁxed over the cycle, however, is empirically realistic and allows us to assess how such
schemes stabilise unemployment. Given b(.), the employment tax τ has to ensure
(long run) budget balance; i.e. the expected discounted revenues from the employ-
ment tax must equal the expected discounted beneﬁts paid. Hence, on average, τ
describes a fair insurance premium.3
3A technical issue here is that recessions could last so long that debt repayment would exceed
8Given that all jobs are equally likely to be destroyed, assume that the UI program
provides universal coverage - that each worker when laid-oﬀ through job destruction
returns to the pool of unemployed workers with duration s =0 . This assumes there
are no qualiﬁcation periods for re-entitlement to full UI coverage, which is counter-
factual. In the simulations that follow, however, the average employment spell is
a r o u n d4y e a r sw h i c hi sm u c hl o n g e rt h a ns t a n d a r dq u a l i ﬁcation periods. (This
choice is consistent with Cole and Rogerson [1999] who report workers in the U.S. get
laid-oﬀ, on average, every 4.5 years). Assume also that only workers who have been
laid oﬀ are entitled to receive UI payments - workers who quit receive nothing.
Let Ft(s) denote the proportion of unemployed workers at time t whose current
unemployment spell is no greater than s. As negotiated wages generally depend on a
worker’s unemployment duration s, then the equilibrium rate of job creation at time
t depends on Ft. As the value of being unemployed depends on (future) job creation
rates, it will depend on how Ft evolves stochastically over time. Unfortunately Ft
is inﬁnitely dimensional. Even given the above simple policy paradigm, describing
equilibrium is not tractable unless we assume ﬁr m sh a v ea l lt h eb a r g a i n i n gp o w e r .A n
additional advantage of that assumption, however, is that it also makes transparent
that a duration dependent UI system generates intergenerational transfers which
stabilise employment over the cycle.4
Assume b(.) is positive and non-increasing with duration and a worker obtains
ﬂow value l>0 while unemployed. Assume b(0) + l<p− τ so that a gain to trade
always exists and so (eﬃcient) bargaining implies that any contact between a vacancy
a n da nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e ra l w a y sr e s u l t si nam a t c h .
the total output of the economy. One way to avoid this problem would be to sell the ﬁnancing of
the scheme to an organization with deep pockets.
4Cahuc et al (2003) estimate bargaining power in a model of on-the job search and ﬁnd that ﬁrms
have all the bargaining power. In their framework, on-the-job search implies employed workers obtain
higher wages over time by generating outside oﬀers, but those expected rents are extracted by the
hiring ﬁrm through a lower starting wage.
9When a ﬁrm hires a worker, they write an enforceable contract which states that
the worker earns some ﬁxed wage w until job destruction occurs. The previous
matching literature (e.g. Millard and Mortensen [1997], Fredriksson and Holmlund
[2001]) instead assumes that workers always renegotiate ex-post, and that wages are
determined by Nash bargaining where the worker’s threatpoint is the value of being
unemployed with full UI coverage. This is a convenient assumption rather than a
compelling one. Indeed, given a worker cannot claim UI during renegotiations (the
worker has not been laid oﬀ), and that a worker who quits is not entitled to receive
UI then, in the absence of an enforceable contract, the ﬁrm (with all the bargaining
power) would ex-post renegotiate w = l and the worker would be indiﬀerent to
quitting (with no UI support).
To advertise a vacancy, a ﬁrm must pay a ﬂow cost adt>0 per instant dt > 0.
If the ﬁrm does not advertise, its contact probability is zero. With free entry, the
number of vacancies adjusts so that the expected discounted value of advertising is
zero.
3 Characterising Equilibrium.
In general the relevant aggregate state variable at time t is φt =( Ut,F t,λ t).L e t
Vu(s,φt) denote the value of being unemployed in state φt with unemployment du-
ration s ≥ 0. As ﬁr m sh a v ea l lt h eb a r g a i n i n gp o w e r ,aw o r k e rw i t hu n e m p l o y m e n t
duration s in state φt is hired with an employment contract which has value equal to
Vu(s,φt). Hence the recursive Bellman equation describing Vu over arbitrarily small





[l + b(s)]dt + EtVu(s + dt,φt+dt)
¤
;
where the worker obtains ﬂow payoﬀ [l + b(s)]dt over the next instant, and obtains
payoﬀ Vu(s + dt,φt+dt) from then on, regardless of whether the worker receives a job
oﬀer or not. The value of being unemployed is therefore the expected discounted
10value of being unemployed forever. As by assumption UI payments are independent












is the worker’s option value of consuming his/her remaining UI entitlement at dura-
tion s. It is now straightforward to compute equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium Wage Formation
Consider the value of being employed on wage contract w in state φt. Should a job
destruction shock occur, the worker is laid oﬀ and obtains payoﬀ Vu(0) as described
above. As the wage paid is constant over time, the value of the worker’s employment
contract depends only on φt via the current job destruction rate λt. Let V i
e(w) denote













e (w) − V
i
e(w)]
where the worker obtains ﬂow utility w while employed, is laid oﬀ at rate λ
i in state






















Rearrange this equation for V i
e(w) in terms of V 1
e (w), and use that to substitute out
the V j
e (w) in the previous equation. Solving and simpliﬁcation yields the following.



























the solution above simpliﬁes to the more recognisable form V i
e =( w + λ
iVu(0))/(r +
λ
i). Stochastic job destruction rates, however, imply λ
i
reﬂects that with positive
probability the economy will switch to a diﬀerent job destruction state in the future.
For example, the above implies λ
1
>λ
1, reﬂecting that job destruction rates will be







As ﬁrms have all the bargaining power, the negotiated wage is set where the
worker is indiﬀerent to accepting employment. Given a worker with unemployment





Solving this equation using (1) and (3) implies the following.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium Wages
Given unemployment duration s and job destruction state i, the equilibrium wage
agreement wi(s) is
w
i(s)=l + rB(s) − λ
i
[Vu(0) − Vu(s)]. (5)
Equilibrium wages are composed of three terms: the wage compensates for fore-
gone leisure, the option value of foregone UI payments at the point of hire (appropri-
ately annuitised) and there is a wage deduction which takes into account the value of
becoming re-entitled to full UI coverage in the event of a future job destruction shock.
Section 4 discusses this wage equation in detail. Here we complete the description of
equilibrium.
123.2 Equilibrium Vacancy Creation.
Let Πi(w) denote the ﬁrm’s expected discounted proﬁt with contracted wage w in job
destruction state i. As a free entry equilibrium implies the ﬁrm makes zero proﬁti f
the job is destroyed, then standard arguments imply
rΠ









Using the same method as before yields
Π
i(w)=





i implies Πk(w) < Πi(w); ﬁlled jobs are less valuable in high
job destruction states.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium Job Creation.
In state φt with λt = λ
i, free entry of vacancies implies equilibrium labor market









Proof: Given λt = λ
i and contact with an unemployed worker with unemployment
duration s, the ﬁrm negotiates a labor contract with equilibrium wage wi(s) described
by Proposition 1. This generates expected discounted proﬁt Πi(wi(s)). Given the
distribution of uncompleted spells of unemployment Ft, free entry of vacancies implies
the ﬂow cost of creating a vacancy equals the expected gain through contacting a
currently unemployed job seeker, where m(θ)/θ describes the instantaneous contact
rate given labor market tightness θ.
Having described equilibrium wage formation and equilibrium market tightness,
the description of the equilibrium market dynamics φt is now straightforward.
3.3 Equilibrium Market Dynamics
Given φt, u n e m p l o y m e n ta tt i m et evolves according to the diﬀerential equation
dUt
dt
= λt(1 − Ut) − m(θt)Ut,
13where the ﬁrst term on the right hand side describes the inﬂow of workers into un-
employment through job destruction, while the second describes the outﬂow through
matching.
Given φt and for dt > 0 but arbitrarily small, the distribution of unemployment
spells Ft evolves according to
Ut+dtFt+dt(s)=[ 1− m(θt)dt]UtFt(s − dt)+λ
idt[1 − Ut]+o(dt)
where the left hand side describes the number of unemployed workers at date t + dt
with unemployment duration no greater than s, which equals the number unemployed
in the previous instant with duration no more than s − dt and who failed to get a
job over that instant, plus those employed who lost their job and so entered the pool
of unemployed workers with duration s =0 . Taking the limit dt → 0 and using the











G i v e na ni n i t i a ld i s t r i b u t i o no fu n e m p l o y m e n ts p e l l s ,F0(s), initial level of unem-
ployment U0 and the Markov process describing λt, these two diﬀerential equations,
together with Proposition 2 describing θt, imply a ﬁrst order Markov process for
φt = {Ut,F t,λ t}.
Finally given the UI proﬁle b(.) and the initial state of the economy (U0,F 0,λ 0),
t h ee m p l o y m e n tt a xr a t eτ has to achieve long run budget balance. Given the above













3.4 Existence of a Market Equilibrium.
When λ
i = λ for all i and for a constant UI program b(s)=b for all s, it is straight-
foward to show that a steady state equilibrium exists if b is small enough. In fact Coles
14and Masters (2002) establish that if one equilibrium exists, then generically there are
two. That paper identiﬁes such equilibria by ﬁrst ﬁxing an arbitrary value for τ and
solving for steady state labour market tightness, denoted θ
∗(τ), and unemployment




For Laﬀer curve reasons, either budgetb a l a n c ei sn o tp o s s i b l e( b e n e ﬁts b are too high
to be fully funded) or there are two tax rates which achieve budget balance. Not
surprisingly the equilibria are Pareto rankable, where the equilibrium with the lower
tax rate and higher employment level is preferred.
The same existence argument applies to the stochastic structure described above.
For given beneﬁtp r o ﬁle b(.) and initial values U0,F 0,λ 0, ﬁx an arbitrary tax rate τ.
Equation (6) describes equilibrium proﬁts Πi which are continuous in τ. Hence for
given φt, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the aggregate vacancy creation decision,
which determines equilibrium labor market tightness θt, is continuous in τ.Hence the
diﬀerential equations describing the evolution of Ut,F t,λ t are continuous in τ and so
given (U0,F 0,λ 0), the expected discounted tax returns and beneﬁtp a y m e n t sa r ea l s o
continuous in τ. The Laﬀer curve argument now goes through: τ =0implies zero
tax revenues, while τ = p − l implies no vacancy creation. Hence the budget surplus
is hump-shaped in τ, and typically there is either no tax rate which achieves budget
balance, or there will be at least two. Obviously the lowest tax rate which achieves
budget balance is preferred.
4 Discussion and Simulations
4.1 Intergenerational Transfer of Rents
A primary insight of this framework is that with non-competitive wage formation,
the UI system transfers rents from future employers to current matched ﬁrm/worker
15pairs. The point is made most readily in the steady state case (λ
i = λ for all i and αw
constant). In that case, Proposition 1 implies an unemployed worker with duration s
negotiates wage
w(s)=l + rB(s) − λ[Vu(0) − Vu(s)]. (8)
The worker extracts rents B(s) [suitably annuitised] reﬂecting the worker’s option
value of consuming his/her remaining UI entitlement, while the ﬁrm extracts the
surplus attached to becoming re-entitled to full UI coverage in the future.
It is useful to decompose Vu(0), which is the expected discounted lifetime utility







where with probability e−αwx t h ew o r k e rr e m a i n su n e m p l o y e da td u r a t i o nx and so
receives ﬂow utility [l+b(x)]dx over the next instant, and with probability e−αwxαwdx
ﬁnds work at that duration with expected payoﬀ Ve = Vu(x).5 This expression decom-
poses Vu(0) into expected UI payments received from the government, and expected
rents extracted from the worker’s next employer.







where the integral term computes the expected discounted UI payments made to a
worker who is laid-oﬀ.A s Vu(x) ≡ l/r + B(x), the above decomposition of Vu(0)




= l + b(s)+αw[Ve − Vu]
where Ve(s) is the value of becoming employed at duration s. Hence
(r + αw)Vu −
dVu
ds
= l + b(s)+αwVe.
Integration using integrating factor e−(r+αw)s implies the form stated, where Ve(s)=Vu(s) when













The value of being laid oﬀ is composed of three terms: the value of leisure while
unemployed, the expected UI beneﬁts received from the government (with fair in-
surance) and the expected rents from ﬁnding employment at a new ﬁrm. The third
term makes it explicit that the UI system, by raising the option value of remaining
unemployed, allows the worker to extract greater rents from future employers.
Using (10) and Vu(s)=l/r + B(s) in (8) now implies





which makes explicit the intergenerational transfer of rents across ﬁrms. When hiring
a worker, who becomes re-entitled to full UI coverage, the ﬁrm pays a lower wage
reﬂecting the rents the worker will extract from his/her next employer in the event
of a job destruction shock. The ﬁr m ,h o w e v e r ,a l s oh a st op a yaw a g ep r e m i u m
to compensate the worker for his/her option value of continued UI. Of course those
rents were appropriated by the worker’s previous employer. The UI system therefore
implies a transfer of rents from future hiring ﬁrms to current hiring ﬁrms. Also note
that the worker pays the insurance tax τ (but is fully compensated by expected future
UI receipts when laid-oﬀ).






which describes the expected rents extracted from the next employer by a laid-oﬀ
w o r k e r .N o t ea l s ot h a tt h ea b o v ei m p l i e st h ej o i n tv a l u eo ft h em a t c h















is directly proportional to R. Hence given αw, t h ej o i n tv a l u eo ft h em a t c hi si n c r e a s i n g
in the level of UI beneﬁts - the worker/ﬁrm pair extract greater rents from the worker’s
17next employer. Indeed, the privately optimal UI contract (with free entry of ﬁrms)
raises the worker’s reservation wage to the point where the worker’s next employer
makes zero proﬁt by hiring that worker at his/her reservation wage.
An important feature for what follows is that the rent extraction term, R, is
increasing in the re-employment rate αw. To see this, note that αwe−αws is the density
function corresponding to the exponential distribution and that a lower αw implies
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. As e−rsB(s) is decreasing in s, then (11) implies
al o w e rαw yields a lower R. The intuition is that when laid oﬀ,al o w e rαw implies
the worker expects to be unemployed longer and so expects a smaller remaining
entitlement B(.) at the point of hire, and the longer duration implies those rents are
discounted more. This insight plays an important part in the simulations that follow
- ﬁrms that hire in recessions (characterised by low re-employment rates) lose fewer
rents to unemployed workers.
There is, however, an alternative interpretation for this result. Note that (10)
implies R ≡ Vu(0) − τ/λ− l/r. As Vu(0) = l/r +
R ∞






The ﬁrst term does not depend on αw. Hence R is increasing in αw because τ falls
with αw ((see (9)). A higher re-employment rate implies the government expects to
make fewer UI payments to each laid oﬀ worker and so lowers the (fair) insurance
tax.
The two expressions for R are equivalent (use integration by parts in (11)), and
so the two interpretations have to be consistent. The underlying insight is that there
is a funding externality - when a ﬁrm hires a worker, the ﬁrm does not take into
a c c o u n tt h a ti ts a v e st h eg o v e r n m e n tm o n e y( t h eg o v e r n m e n tp a y sn om o r eU It o
that worker). The UI system essentially guarantees each laid-oﬀ worker a payoﬀ
equal to Vu(0), but the funding of that payoﬀ - whether as government UI or higher
wages from a future employer - depends on the hiring rate. A lower hiring rate implies
future hiring ﬁrms do not bear so much of the cost of the UI system and so current
18ﬁr m sh a v et ob e a rm o r eo fi t-t h eg o v e r n m e n tr a i s e st h ei n s u r a n c et a xτ to cover the
promised payments.
This insight is particularly valuable for the stochastic case. As we shall see, higher
re-employment rates in a boom imply ﬁr m sl o s em o r er e n t st ou n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r s
(re-employment rates are higher) and so “over-contribute” to the cost of guaranteeing
laid-oﬀ workers payoﬀ Vu(0). This acts as a job creation subsidy in recessions.
Given these rent transfer eﬀects, it is useful to consider how they aﬀect the ex-
pected value of ﬁlling a vacancy. As steady state implies unemployment spell distri-
















Note, r>0 implies the UI system reduces the expected value of ﬁlling a vacancy in
a steady state; the expected rents lost to new hires exceeds the (discounted) value of
extracting rents from the worker’s next employer. More generous UI payments leads,
in a steady state, to lower expected proﬁtp e rﬁlled vacancy and hence lower vacancy
creation rates and higher unemployment.
This result, however, needs to be interpreted with care as it ignores non-steady
state dynamics. For example, suppose the economy begins life with all workers un-
employed and none entitled to receive UI. As ﬁrms have all the bargaining power,
these workers obtain no surplus by ﬁnding work. Assuming the economy converges
to the steady state, then any rents lost by ﬁrms in that steady state must have been
appropriated by previous employers. Hence outside of steady state, the UI scheme
allows the early hiring ﬁrms to extract rents from later ﬁrms. Such transfers imply
high initial vacancy creation rates and a more rapid decline in unemployment over
time. It is precisely this mechanism which stabilises unemployment levels over the
cycle.
194.2 Employment Stabilisation over the Cycle.
















by hiring a worker at time t in state i. Note, the ﬁrm loses rents B(s) by hiring a
worker with unemployment duration s, but gains expected surplus λ
i
Vu(0)−τ through
re-entitlement eﬀects. The previous section established that in a steady state with
λ
i = λ, discounting implies the the expected loss
R ∞
0 B(s)dF(s) dominates the re-
entitlement eﬀect. This is not necessarily the case outside of a steady state. In
particular the UI scheme raises the expected value of ﬁlling a job in the recession if
(i) the currently unemployed have relatively long unemployment spells, i.e. dFt(s)
has more weight at long durations s. In that case, fewer rents are extracted by the
currently unemployed, and
(ii) hiring rates are expected to be higher in the future, so that future hiring ﬁrms
bear more of the cost of providing the laid-oﬀ worker payoﬀ Vu(0) when the job is
d e s t r o y e d( a n dt h eﬁnancing tax rate τ is correspondingly low).
The numerical example given in the Introduction suggests the potential magnitude
of the transfer of rents from ﬁrms hiring in booms to ﬁrms hiring in recessions. We
now use a numerical simulation to establish formally that a duration dependent UI
system lowers both the mean and the variance of unemployment levels over the cycle.
4.3 A Simulation.
Consider an economy whose welfare system is composed of two schemes: (i) a 6-month
UI scheme, which pays b(s)=bUI for unemployment durations s below 6 months,
and (ii) a UA (unemployment assistance) scheme which pays bUA to workers whose
UI entitlement has expired; i.e. when s exceeds 6 months. A pure UI scheme implies
bUA =0 , while a pure UA scheme (indeﬁnite payments) implies bUA = bUI.
20The aim is to consider how changing the composition of this welfare system (i.e.
changing bUI,b UA) aﬀects labor market activity over the business cycle. Throughout,
we shall only consider compensated changes so that the ﬁnancing tax rate τ is the
same in all simulated economies. Hence the diﬀerence in economic activity is not due
to changes in the implied employment tax rate.
We consider a two state case, N =2 , and π1 = π2 =0 .5. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas matching function, so that m(θ)=Aθ
η, the chosen parameter values are
described in Table 1.6
p match productivity 1
l ﬂow value of leisure 0.2
a ﬂow vacancy cost 100
r discount rate 0.000107
A matching scale parameter 0.0333
η
elasticity of the matching rate with
respect to the measure of vacancies
0.5
λ
1 job-destruction rate in booms 0.000548
λ
2 job-destruction rate in recessions 0.000913
γ arrival rate of regime shock 0.0044
Table 1: Structural Parameters
The structural parameters are based on a time unit of one day. The match pro-
ductivity is a normalization. The ﬂow value of leisure is similar to numbers used
elsewhere (e.g. Millard and Mortensen [1997]). The ﬂow vacancy cost is chosen to
generate reasonable average unemployment rates. It looks large because it has to
capture all the capitalization costs of job creation and any subsequent non-labor pro-
6Although we provide some justiﬁcation for the parameters chosen, this is not meant to be a
formal calibration exercise - assuming ﬁrms have all the bargaining power rules out a more explicit
quantitative analysis.
21duction costs.7 The discount rate is based on the 4% per annum number standard
to the real business cycle literature. The matching elasticity and scale parameter are
within the range found from estimates of the matching function (e.g. Blanchard and
Diamond [1989]).
The job-destruction rates are based on an average job life of 5 years in booms and
3 years in recessions. This compares with the ﬁgure obtained by Cole and Rogerson
[1999] for the U.S. of 4.5 years. The value of γ [and πi =0 .5] implies their preferred
switching rate of 0.2 per quarter.
The baseline economy is a pure UA welfare system; i.e. bUA = bUI and the level
of payments is set where bUA = bUI =0 .2. With l =0 .2, this implies an equilibrium
wage of 0.4 and hence a replacement rate of 50% in the baseline economy. Simulations
ﬁnd that the employment tax rate τ required for expected long-run budget balance
is 0.018; i.e., 1.8% of total output.
Table 2 reports the simulation results. Each row describes a simulation with the
same initial values {U0,F 0,λ 0} but a diﬀerent value of bUI and bUA. For each bUA,
preliminary simulations were run to ﬁnd the corresponding value of bUI so that the
budget balancing tax rate τ remained neutral at 0.018. Given each pair (bUI,b UA)
and the same initial values {U0,F 0,λ 0}, the results described are for a simulation
which is iterated over 100,000 days, the ﬁrst 10,000 of which are dropped from the
calculations (to avoid initial value distortions). Each set of results is computed using
the same realized sequence of job destruction shocks.
7Some models of this type (e.g. Albrecht and Vroman [2002]) use a parameter to represent a ﬂow
cost paid by the ﬁrm for the duration of the job, ﬁlled or vacant. Such an approach has the cosmetic
beneﬁt of a more realistic parameter value in simulations. But when ﬁrms have all the bargaining
power, so that wages are determined purely by worker-side factors, this has little qualitative eﬀect
on the results.














0.20 0.20 0.400 8.67 1.83 6.69 1.24 6.69 1.56
0.23 0.15 0.352 7.99 1.72 6.75 1.28 6.75 1.58
0.26 0.10 0.303 7.42 1.62 6.79 1.31 6.78 1.59
0.28 0.05 0.254 6.92 1.54 6.83 1.34 6.83 1.61
0.30 0 0.206 6.50 1.46 6.86 1.36 6.86 1.62
Table 2: Unemployment, job creation and job destruction, T =6Months.
The top row describes the baseline economy with a pure UA scheme (indeﬁnite
welfare payments) and a replacement rate of 50%. The bottom describes a pure
UI scheme where all welfare payments cease after 6 months. The intervening rows
consider a 6 month UI scheme but with diﬀerent levels of UA support. All require
the same budget balancing tax rate τ =0 .018.
Column 4 describes how average unemployment varies across these welfare schemes
and demonstrates that the pure UA scheme implies a signiﬁcant increase in average
unemployment. Column 3 shows why. wH(0) = wL(0) = w0 i st h ew a g ear e c e n t l y
laid oﬀ worker negotiates. Although no more costly to operate (the required ﬁnanc-
i n gt a xr a t ei st h es a m e ) ,t h ep u r eU As c h e m ei m p l i e sal a r g ei n c r e a s ei nt h eo p t i o n
value of remaining unemployed. As implied in the discussion above, this reduces the
expected value of ﬁlling a vacancy (in a steady state) and leads to higher average
unemployment levels.
For these parameter values, the constant UI scheme implies an average expected
duration of unemployment of around 18 weeks (the U.K. in comparison has an average
of around 26), while the pure UI scheme implies an average duration of around 13
weeks (as in the U.S.). But note that to obtain the same balancing employment tax
rate, the value for bUI is necessarily high in the pure UI scheme (bUI =0 .3 in the
23pure UI scheme, while bUA = bUI =0 .2 in the pure UA scheme).
As equilibrium employment levels are higher in the pure UI case, the assumed
job destruction process implies that the mean and variance of the number of jobs
destroyed per period is greatest in the pure UI scheme (see the Job Destruction
ﬁg u r e s ,c o l u m n s8a n d9o fT a b l e2 ) .C e t e r i sp a r i b u s ,t h i sw o u l di m p l yt h ep u r eU I
system generates greater unemployment variance over the cycle. Column 5, however,
reveals that the pure UI system also yields a lower variance of unemployment. This is
due to the stabilisation eﬀects discussed above. In essence intergenerational transfers
due to re-entitlement eﬀects subsidize job creation rates in recessions, and so prevent
unemployment becoming too high during extended periods of high job destruction,
while dampening the increase in employment during booms.
Figure 2 depicts an impulse response function which describes how the average
wage negotiated by workers hired at any point in time changes as the economy moves
into recession. It has been constructed for the pure UI economy (bottom row) of
Table 2. Prior to time 0 the economy is in the conditional steady-state associated
with λ = λ
L (a boom). At time 0, λ switches to λ
H forever (though individuals in
the model continue to expect the job destruction state to switch at rate γ.)
There is an initial downward jump in the average hiring wage at time 0, which
reﬂects the increased value of becoming re-entitled to future UI (see Proposition
1). The wave of newly laid-oﬀ workers, however, causes a decrease in the average
uncompleted spell of unemployment. This feature of the data is well documented in
the long-term unemployment literature (e.g. Machin and Manning (1999)). In our
model, this fall in the average uncompleted spell leads, at least initially, to a spell of
rising wages. This initial composition eﬀect washes out at around 9 months.
In the longer—term, the economy moves toward a conditional steady-state associ-
ated with high job destruction. Not surprisingly this generates higher unemployment
levels and longer unemployment spells. But re-entitlement eﬀects, which enable hir-
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Figure 2: Impulse response: Percent deviation of average hiring wage from its (un-
conditional) expected value.
future boom), imply unemployment is not so high as it otherwise would have been.
The overall eﬀect is a reduction in the variance of unemployment over the cycle.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that when UI payments are duration dependent, re-entitlement
eﬀects generate transfers from ﬁrms that hire in the future to currently hiring ﬁrms.
As more rents are extracted from hiring ﬁrms when re-employment rates are high,
this implies a net transfer of rents from ﬁr m st h a th i r ei nb o o m st oﬁrms that hire
in recessions. Using an equilibrium matching framework, simulations ﬁnd that a
switch from a pure UA system to a pure 6-month UI system lowers both average
unemployment and the variance of unemployment levels over the cycle.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations provided in the Introduction suggest the net
transfer may be worth as much as 6 weeks UI (from boom to bust). With a 50%
25replacement rate this suggests that ﬁrms hiring in recessions receive a subsidy equal
to three weeks wages. Suitably annuitised, where an average employment spell is
around 4 years, suggests a 1.5% wage subsidy. This is not a huge amount. Indeed,
the simulations show that average hiring wages do not move much over the cycle -
hiring wages in the conditional steady state associated with low job destruction rates
are only 1.2% higher than in the conditional steady state associated with high job
destruction rates, and only 0.6% greater than the average wage paid in the ergodic
steady state. Indeed, it is interesting that the average wage paid across all employed
workers hardly changes over the cycle. Nevertheless being a targeted hiring subsidy
in recessions, simulations ﬁnd these transfers are eﬀective in stabilising employment
levels over the cycle.
For ease of exposition, the paper has assumed the business cycle is driven by
variations in job destruction rates (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger [1992]). Shimer [2003]
challenges this view of the cycle and argues that the cycle in the U.S. is instead driven
by aggregate productivity shocks (and inﬂexible wages). Introducing productivity
shocks complicates our model as renegotiation constraints might bind; e.g. the wage
m i g h tb er e n e g o t i a t e dw h e n e v e rp r o d u c t i v i t yp<w .Of course when hiring, the ﬁrm
and worker anticipate such renegotiations and, as the ﬁrm has all the bargaining
power, the starting wage adjusts so that the ﬁrm still extracts all expected rents (see
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a),(2002b) for related insights). Although wages evolve
stochastically during the lifetime of the job, the above insights continue to hold - re-
entitlement eﬀects imply a net subsidy to ﬁrms who hire in low productivity phases
(with low re-employment rates).
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